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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the fiscal sustainability of an emerging, 
dollarized, oil-exporting country: Ecuador. A cointegrated VAR 
approach is adopted in testing, first, if the intertemporal budget 
constraint is satisfied in Ecuador and, second, in identifying the 
permanent and transitory shocks that affect a fiscal policy 
characterized by inertia and a heavy dependence on oil revenues. 
Following confirmation that the debt-GDP ratio does not place 
the Ecuadorian budget under any pressure, we reformulate the 
model and identify two forces that push the fiscal system out of 
equilibrium, namely, economic activity and oil revenues 
implemented in the government budget. We argue that Ecuador 
needs to recover control of its monetary policy and to promote 
the diversification of its economy in order that non-oil tax 
revenues can replace oil revenues as a pushing force. Finally, we 
calculate quarterly elasticities of tax revenues with respect to 
Ecuador’s GDP and that of eight Eurozone countries. We 
illustrate graphically how the Eurozone countries with low 
positive or high negative elasticities’ levels suffer debt problems 
after the crisis. This finding emphasizes the pressing need for 
Ecuador to strengthen the connection between its tax revenues 
and output, and also suggests that the convergence of these 
elasticities in the Eurozone might contribute to the success of an 
eventually future fiscal union. 
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1. Introduction
Compared to the large body of empirical literature analysing the effects of monetary policy, 
economic research examining the effects of fiscal policy has been much scarcer until recently. 
Nevertheless, the current sovereign debt crisis in the euro area has revived the academic and 
policy debate on the economic impact of expansive fiscal policies and high public debt levels. It is 
worth to note that market concerns with respect to fiscal sustainability in euro area countries have 
grown and spread to other countries, reinforcing the concern that high public debt levels harm 
economic growth. 
In this context, Ecuador is a particularly interesting country to study. The fact that it relies on its 
fiscal policy to counteract both external and internal shocks should, it is assumed, result in the 
failure of current budget constraints. However, on the contrary, as Figure 1 in Annex II shows, 
Ecuador has not had to cut its expenditure and, moreover, reports a falling total debt-GDP ratio, 
two unlikely achievements for its European counterparts immersed in the current economic crisis. 
Figure 1 describes the pronounced decline that Ecuadorian debt-GDP ratio experienced since 
2000. This decline has to be understood in the specific context of this South-American country, 
notwithstanding. On the peak of a devastating economic crisis, Ecuador was forced to default on
its Brady bonds ($6.604 million of the total debt) in the summer of 1999. The restructuring 
process, officially in August 2000, resulted in a reduction of close to 40 percent in the face value 
of the tendered bonds. After this event, Ecuador focused on its fiscal policy on debt reduction. 
Through the Organic Law on Fiscal Responsibility, Stabilization and Transparency1, in 2002, was 
created the Stabilization Fund for Social and Productive Investment and Debt Reduction 
(FEIREP) as a special trust fund, managed by the Central Bank. The FEIREP funds earmarked 
70 percent for debt-buyback operations; 20 percent to stabilize oil revenues and for emergency 
spending, and 10 percent for education and health spending. The Fund was replaced in 2005 by 
the Special Account of the Productive and Social Reactivation, Development of Science and 
Technology and the Fiscal Stabilization (CEREPS). The 70 percent earmarking to debt reduction 
was reduced to 35 percent2
1 See the third title of the original version of the Organic Law on Fiscal Responsibility, Stabilization and 
Transparency published in the Ecuadorian Official Registry on June 4, 2002.
. The debt-GDP ratio fell from 86 percent by end-2000 to about 34 
percent by end-2006. However, this targeted debt reduction policy carried out by the government 
caused the revalorization of its international bonds, becoming the debt buyback even more 
2 See Cueva (2008) for a more extensive description about the FEIREP and CEREPS funds.
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onerous. This fact was the basis of the debt repudiation rhetoric of president Correa3. In 
December 2008 the debt-GDP ratio achieved a value around 23 percent. The public external debt 
was the least burdensome it had been in over three decades. Nevertheless, Ecuador decided to 
default again, making clear its “unwillingness to pay” rather than its “inability to pay”4
Most studies in the literature have examined the effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic 
variables in order to provide robust stylized facts regarding the effects of fiscal policy shocks. The 
discrepancies that exist, it is argued, result from the different methodologies adopted to analyse 
these shocks (see Caldara and Kamps, 2008). Irrespective however of the identification approach 
selected, all the studies concur that positive government spending shocks have persistent positive 
output, inflation and short term interest rate effects
.
5
The same holds for tax shocks. There is a degree of consensus in articles using the sign-
restrictions approach (Mountford and Uhlig, 2009) or a narrative approach (Romer and Romer,
2010) that unanticipated tax increases have strongly negative output effects. However, conflicting 
results are obtained when using the structural VAR approach, so that while Blanchard and 
Perotti’s (2002) findings coincide with the aforementioned studies, Perotti (2002) suggests that 
output – as well as the inflation and short term interest rate – are unaffected
.
6
Recently, these models have been extended to satisfy the government budget constraint
.
7
3 See Correa (2005).  
. Since 
the fiscal variables of different countries react distinctly to macroeconomic variable shocks, such 
analyses should shed some light on how best to harmonize fiscal policies in monetary unions. 
Favero et al. (2011) identify the existence of heterogeneities between countries due to different 
4 The most controversial default was that made in 2008. President Rafael Correa justified the country’s 
moratorium on the basis that Ecuador’s foreign debt obligations were “immoral,” “illegal” and “illegitimate”. 
Ecuador stopped payments on 3.2 billion, confined to two of the country’s sovereign bonds: the one 
maturing in 2012 and another due in 2030, both born out of an earlier sovereign default that took place in 
August 1999 and accounting for nearly one-third of the external public debt in 2008. Between April and 
November 2009, the government repurchased the two bonds against cash at a steep discount of 65-70
percent on their face value. See Moodys (2009), Salmon (2009), Das, Papaioannou and Trebesch (2012), 
Feibelman (2010) and Díaz-Cassou et al. (2008) in order to go in depth on the Ecuadorian defaults over the 
last decade. 
5 In the case of government spending, Perotti (2008) reports that both private consumption and real wages 
significantly and persistently increase in response to a positive spending shock, while employment does not 
react. Mountford and Uhlig (2009) find that the response of private consumption is close to zero and 
statistically insignificant, while Ramey (2011) reports a negative response to such a shock. Burnside et al. 
(2004) provide evidence that the real wage persistently and significantly falls while employment persistently 
and significantly increases.
6 It should be stressed that all these studies were undertaken using a very similar US sample period. 
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and Romer and Romer (2010) simply extend the sample period first studied in 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) which ran from 1947:1 to 1997:4. 
7 For instance, Favero and Giavazzi (2007) estimate a fiscal VAR applying two approaches: structural VAR 
and a narrative approach.          
They include debt and the stock-flow identity linking debt and deficits, and report more sizeable effects of 
fiscal policy on output in 
the narrative approach than in the standard structural VARs.
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fiscal reaction functions, different degrees of openness, and different debt dynamics. They also 
highlight the importance of including feedback between fiscal and macroeconomic variables in 
VAR models, since it conditions the reactions of both variable types to fiscal shocks. 
Bohn (1998) adds to the debate about fiscal sustainability by demonstrating that rejections of low-
order difference-stationarity and cointegration are consistent with the intertemporal budget 
constraint and he suggests that error-correction-type policy reactions are a promising alternative 
for understanding debt and deficit problems. He also estimates a positive response of primary 
surpluses to the debt-GDP ratio, suggesting the sustainability of US fiscal policy for the sample 
period 1916-1995. Other empirical studies adopting the same line include Bohn (2005, 2007) for 
the US; Collignon (2012) for Europe; Fincke and Greiner (2012) for selected countries in the euro 
area; and, Kia (2008) who undertakes the analysis for two emerging countries (Iran and Turkey). 
Few studies to date have examined Ecuador’s fiscal policy. Cueva (2008) and Almeida et al. 
(2005) report that the legal framework is cumbersome regarding the distribution and earmarking 
of oil and tax revenues, creating large rigidities in fiscal management. They describe a “rigid 
budget characterised by inertia” that offers just eight percentage points to counteract 
unpredictable shocks8
Mejía et al. (2006) claim that dollarization reforms have limited the diapason of fiscal instruments 
available to governments. They warn of the dangers of dependency on oil revenues as a source 
of instability in a balanced budget. Marí Del Cristo and Gómez-Puig (2013) also remark the 
imminent inflation pressures in Ecuador due to the rise of pass-through and an inexistent 
monetary policy to deal with. These findings might question the theory that low-inflation policies 
increase the confidence of bond market investors, and governments may, therefore, have even 
greater access to borrowing. Actually, fixed exchange rates and dollarization restrain monetary 
policy but leave open debt-financed fiscal policy, at least until debt burdens become 
unsustainable (Palley, 2004).
. Other articles examining issues of debt sustainability include López-Calix 
(2003) and Tinsley (2003), who adopt standard approaches to sustainability; Barnhill and Kopits 
(2003) who, in developing a Value-at-Risk approach, find that the volatility of sovereign spreads 
and of oil prices constitute major sources of risk for Ecuador’s public sector; and Alvarado et al. 
(2004), who calculate debt threshold sensitivities for different assumptions regarding revenue 
volatility and expenditure adjustments. They emphasize that uncertainty in government tax 
revenues and the inflexibility in its non-interest expenditure leave Ecuador vulnerable to fiscal 
crises in the future. 
8 The composition of public expenditure is as follows: 26 per cent for wages, 10 per cent for current 
transfers, 8 per cent for transfers 
to regional governments (gobiernos seccionales), 3 per cent for investment projects, 10 per cent for interest 
payments and 32 per cent 
for amortizations, among other expenditures.
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This article has two aims: first, to determine if Ecuadorian fiscal policy satisfies the intertemporal 
budget constraint and, second, to determine the main push factors and forces of adjustment 
(permanent and transitory shocks) interacting in the long run equilibrium. The remainder of this 
article is organized as follows. Section II briefly describes the theoretical approach of the 
intertemporal budget constraint extended to oil-exporting countries. Section III presents the 
econometric methodology. Section IV explains the empirical results. Section V examines the 
policy implications based on an examination of elasticities of tax revenues with respect to 
Ecuador’s GDP and that of eight Eurozone countries. Finally, section VI summarizes the 
conclusions that can be drawn from the article. 
2. The Theoretical Model
An increasing debt-GDP ratio depends on the economic environment (rt - gt)dt-1, and on the 
primary surplus. If the interest rate rt exceeds the growth rate gt, then the debt-GDP ratio dt will 
increase indefinitely unless there is a primary surplus which can offset the rising debt service.
The paths of public debt implied by the sequences of primary surplus st and economic 
environment (rt - gt) are:
1
0 0 1
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Assuming the economic environment as given and constant, the accumulation of debt over 
several periods t=1…n:
                                                                            (2)
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Assuming that the transversality condition holds9, fiscal policy will satisfy the intertemporal budget 
constraint (IBC) because it is on a path whereby the present value of expected future primary 
surpluses equals the initial debt:
                                                                                                     (4)
Equation (4) states that debt sustainability requires a variation in the primary budget surplus. A 
surplus is needed when the growth rate falls below the rate of return on government bonds. Thus, 
whether fiscal policy is sustainable or not depends on the sign of the fiscal policy reaction with 
respect to the target: if an increase in debt is followed by an increase in primary surpluses, debt is 
sustainable. In the long run, the debt-GDP ratio is required to converge on an equilibrium position 
that is determined by the nominal growth rate, target reference values and adjustment 
coefficients10
In order to explain the sustainability of oil-producing countries, Kia (2008) extends Barro’s (1979, 
1986) tax smoothing model by introducing energy revenues. In Barro’s approach, the base of real 
taxable income is a deterministic variable yt, a fixed fraction of real GDP that generally depends on 
the path of tax rates. Kia (2008) assumes GDP to be a function of the country’s energy income.
.
t be the avera	
tyt the real tax revenues. The total government revenues of an 
oil-
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 
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   tyt and ENt, the oil revenues derived from the 
exports of the natural resource. The government budget constraint, Equation (4), with constant 
real interest rate, r, and in a situation in which the country has energy income is:
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9 The initial debt equals the expected present value of future primary surpluses if and only if discounted 
future debt converges to 
zero (Bohn, 2005).
10 Collignon (2012) adopting the fiscal reaction function 1 2( ) ( )t ttdefs debtz z     relates the deficit 
and debt ratios 
with the primary surplus. 1z and 2z are the target reference values for the deficit and debt ratios 
respectively under the Stability and 
Growth Pact;  and  are the adjustment speed coefficients by which governments respond to the 
deviation from the deficit and 
debt ratio reference values, respectively.
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where the primary surplus t js  is now different from that in Equation (4) given the inclusion of 
ENt+j11
In line with Kia (2008), we have to make several assumptions for empirical purposes. First, we 
assume that real government expenditure, Govt and the real tax base yt can be expected to 
fluctuate around the common rate of the growth of the economy g. Second, the expected present 
value of energy income is also its current value. This means that all economic agents expect 
energy revenues not to change over the remaining life of the oil reserves
.
12. Third, the oil reserves 
are expected to last forever. This assumption, however, is unsustainable based on OPEP’s 
Annual Statistical Bulletin which states that Ecuador has about 8,235 million barrels of proven 
reserves and an exportable trend of 334 thousand barrels per day in 2011, that is, seventy per 
cent of its production. We thus simplify the model, including the fact that interest rates and price 
levels are kept constant, as we are analyzing a dollarized country13
If we resolve empirically that in the long run oil revenues, as opposed to non-oil tax revenues, are 
pushing away from the steady state, we can assume that this intertemporal budget constraint is 
not sustainable, given that oil revenues will dry up, unless the country diversifies its economy and 
substitutes the volatile oil sector with others that are more sustainable over time. 
.
11 Alvarado (2004) points out the main problem of this given that it assumes that increasing resource 
exploitation to pay the debt 
does not affect sustainability. It is assumed that oil reserves have the same return as the government’s 
other financial assets and 
liabilities. 
12 Where t = m when the country’s energy resources are exhausted, and tI the information available at time 
t, including the state of the economy: 

0
m
rt
tt tEN EN e dtE I  
13 We reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity for Ecuadorian inflation. 
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3. Data and Econometric Methodology
The study of the dynamic response of macroeconomic variables to shifts in fiscal policy is usually 
carried out by estimating a vector autoregressive (VAR) model of the form:
k
t t i ti
i 1
eX X 

 
Where 
tX includes the minimum set of variables required for the VAR analysis, i.e., government 
spending net of interest, net tax revenues, output, inflation and interest rate (Perotti, 2002). Here, 
we extend this set to include the debt level, as Bohn (1998) has shown that the feedback obtained 
from the debt to tax and government spending ratios is statistically significant and economically 
relevant. The importance of monitoring debt dynamics when analysing fiscal policy has also been 
stressed by Romer and Romer (2010), Favero and Giavazzi (2007) and Favero et al. (2011)14
We use monthly data from the Central Bank of Ecuador covering the period 2000:1 to 2012:7. The 
fiscal variables are the log of government expenditure net of interest 
.
This result has clear implications for countries with fixed exchange rate regimes, including pegged 
or monetary union regimes. 
tlgov , the log of non-oil tax 
revenues 
tlrev and the log of oil revenues tlorev . For the first model we use the sum of these 
last two figures to obtain the log of total fiscal revenues: tltrev . The remaining variables are the 
log of the Economic Activity Index (EAI) represented by tleai and the log of the external and 
internal debt-GDP ratio
tldebt _ gdp . The EAI variable was chosen instead of GDP because 
Ecuador was dollarized in 2000:1 and GDP is only reported annually or quarterly; thus, in order to 
be able to use the highest number possible of observations from the dollarized period we include 
the EAI which is reported monthly. Hence, the first model we estimate comprises the following 
14 Romer and Romer (2010) claim that the effect of a US tax shock on output depends on whether the 
change in taxes is motivated by the government’s desire to stabilize the debt or not. Favero and Gavazzi 
(2007) also find that interest rates depend on future monetary policy and the risk premium, both variables 
being affected by the debt dynamics. Hence, the absence of an effect of fiscal shocks on the long-term 
interest rates, a frequent outcome in VAR-based research that omits debt level, is due to a misspecification. 
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vector of endogenous variables: t t tt t, , ,lgov ldebt _ gdpltrev leaiX    
15. We include neither the 
interest rate nor inflation, since both are constant throughout the sample period16.
4. Empirical Results
We start with the CVAR specification. We first estimate the unrestricted VAR(k) model with 
different lag lengths k using general-to-specific testing and information criteria to determine a lag 
length with no autocorrelated error terms. With k=4, the model presents neither autocorrelation 
nor Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) effects. However, normality is strongly 
rejected. The univariate tests show that normality is rejected due to the non-normality in the debt-
GDP ratio variable:  two outliers produce skewed residuals and generate excess kurtosis. The 
outliers are associated with two key moments in Ecuador’s history when, as mentioned, its 
external debt was restructured: August 2000 and June 200917
All our statistical tests are now acceptable. The univariate tests of normality only reveal some 
kurtosis in the residues of the debt-GDP variable but no skewness (which can be considered 
more serious than kurtosis)
.  However, even when the first 
restructuring took place in August 2000, it was not until January 2001 that the total debt-GDP ratio 
illustrated the break level. We, therefore, introduce two unrestricted shift dummies: 2001:01 and 
2009:06, that have the value 1 if t refers to any of those dates but is zero otherwise.
18
Given that we have four trending variables, we allow for trends in the levels and a non-zero mean 
of the cointegration relations. Likewise, we allow for a trend in the cointegration relations, since 
. Thus, our model is well-specified and the empirical results are 
reliable. 
15 Unlike Favero and Giavazzi (2007), we include the debt-GDP ratio among the endogenous variables, in
order to capture the rich 
dynamics of fiscal aggregates in the cointegrated VAR. As the government debt is an accumulation of 
budget deficits, if we include 
the debt-GDP ratio we do not include the interest payments.
16 The empirical application is carried out using CATS software, in line with Juselius (2006), who argues the 
advantages of employing the cointegrated VAR approach over others (cf. Hoover et. al (2007); Juselius, 
2009). See Annex I to a brief explanation.
17 The total external debt ratio was reduced from 106 per cent GDP at the end of 1999 to around 98 per 
cent in 2000 (Quispe-Agnoli, 2006). In June 2009 the Correa government defaulted on $3.2 billion of foreign 
public debt, and then completed a buyback of 91 percent of the defaulted bonds (Sandoval, 2009).
18 Simulation studies have shown that valid statistical inference is sensitive to the violation of some of the 
assumptions, including parameter non-constancy, autocorrelated residuals (the higher, the worse) and 
skewed residuals, while quite robust to others, such as excess kurtosis and residual heteroscedasticity.
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the trends in the levels do not cancel out in the cointegration relations. After testing the non-
stationarity of the variables, we calculate the trace test statistics (Johansen, 1996), one including 
both seasonal and permanent dummies, and a second without dummies as a sensitivity analysis. 
Both tests determine the existence of one cointegration relation; thus, three common stochastic 
trends are pushing the system out of equilibrium. 
Once the CVAR model is restricted to r=1 and has passed a number of diagnostic tests for 
parameter constancy, including the log-likelihood test or recursively calculated trace test 
statistics19
We check that the debt level variable can be excluded from the cointegration relation and the 
weak exogeneity test points to the variables that are pushing the system out of equilibrium, 
namely, the EAI and the government expenditure. Annex III presents the main tables (Table 1 and 
Table 2) related to these results.
, we test the long-run exclusion and weak exogeneity hypotheses. These have been 
tested with a likelihood ratio test procedure described in Johansen (1996), Johansen and Juselius 
(1990) and Juselius (2006). If we accept the null hypothesis of the test of long run exclusion, i.e. a 










 	!

"#epted it defines a 
common driving trend in the system since this variable does not adjust to the long run relations. 
These results can be read in more than one way; thus, it might be that Ecuador’s debt-GDP ratio 
does not place the government under any pressure, or it might be that its intertemporal budget 
constraint cannot be described by cointegration relations if the debt is decreasing during most of 
the sample period while government expenditure rises20
In order to determine the actual exogenous forces that make government expenditure a weak 
exogenous variable we estimate the following CVAR:
, unless government revenues offset the 
difference. However, the revenue variable adjusts to the cointegration relation; it is not a variable 
pushing the system out of equilibrium. The variable which does present this condition is 
government expenditure, and this might confirm its inertial nature as described elsewhere or it 
might correspond to other forces not included in the model.
t t t tt
, , ,lgovlrev leai lorevX     . We   divide 
total revenue between its oil and non-oil sources and exclude the debt-GDP ratio, since here 
again this variable can be excluded from the new model.
19 Interestingly the test of constancy is rejected if the oil revenues variable is included in the model, 
confirming the volatility of 
revenues of this type. All tests are available upon request.
20 Ray and Kozameh (2012) and the World Bank (2005) provide further details about the expansive 
programs addressed at reducing 
poverty levels and raising education levels.
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From the previous model we retain the lag number and the deterministic terms, but we change the 
permanent dummy variables to 2005:4 and 2006:10 in order to avoid problems of skewness in the 
EAI and the oil revenue variable, respectively. We determine the rank with and without dummies 
and decide for r=2 without dummies (See Table 3). The exogeneity tests show the two possible 
common stochastic trends: economic activity and oil revenues (See Table 4).  
Table 5 shows the residual correlations. The government expenses variable is related to both oil 
and non-oil tax revenues; and non-oil tax revenues are related to economic activity, oil revenues 
and government spending. Therefore, we need the structural MA representation, which requires 
structural and uncorrelated residues in order to interpret the empirical shocks adequately.
It can be derived from Annex I that if multiplying by a B matrix, then we add p*p additional 
parameters to the cointegrated VAR. This being the case, we need to impose exactly the same 
number of restrictions on the model’s parameters to achieve a just-identification scheme. Since 
we have four variables, the B matrix adds 16 new coefficients. The assumption that u~IN (0,I) 
implies ((p*(p+1)/2) = 10) ten restrictions on B (four unit coefficients on the diagonal elements and 
six zero restrictions on the off-diagonal elements). 
Four additional restrictions ((p-r)*r =4) are necessary to separate transitory from permanent 
shocks, and two more restrictions are required to achieve a just-identified structural MA model. 
The latter are essential because there are two possible sequences of the transitory shocks and 
two possible sequences of the permanent shocks. A single specification can be obtained by 
imposing one exclusion restriction on the common trend and one exclusion restriction on the 
transitory impulse response. 
The impulse response functions are calculated with the following structurally identified MA model:
t
t
t
t
lrev
lg ov
leai
lorev
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
=
0 0 * *
0 0 * *
0 0 * 0
0 0 * *
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t
s1,ii t
t
s2 ,ii t
t
l1,ii t
t
l 2 ,ii t
u
u
u
u




 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  




+
* 0 * *
* * * *
* * * *
* * * *
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
s1,t
s2 ,t
l1,t
l 2 ,t
u
u
u
u
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
+ 11C B 
s1,t 1
s2,t 1
l1,t 1
2l ,t 1
u
u
u
u




 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The one exclusion restriction on the permanent shocks is defined by assuming that only supply 
shocks can affect economic activity in the long run; thus, oil revenues do not impact on 
production, as proxied by the
tleai variable. The one exclusion restriction on the transitory shocks 
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is defined by assuming “sticky” taxes, so tax revenues do not react immediately to a government 
expenditure shock. 
The estimated matrix B normalized at the largest coefficient in each row in Table 7, defines how 
the orthogonalized permanent and transitory shocks are associated with the estimated CVAR 
residuals. Recovering the last two rows and substituting in the equation: 
t tu Be we obtain the 
combinations which make up the permanent shocks:
/
,2,2 , lg , , ,0.233 0.961 0.381ll t t lrev t ov t leia t lorev tu e e e e eB    
It appears that both the first and the second permanent shocks are given primarily by shocks to 
the economic activity. The results suggest that oil revenue shocks have less influence, which can 
be considered a favourable outcome given the finite nature of oil reserves. The importance of the 
government spending shock is worth noting in the second permanent shock. This is in line with 
reports elsewhere that are critical of the rigid nature of Ecuador’s public budget. Table 6 and 
Figure 7 in Annex III describe the dynamic impulse response functions after 23 periods for each of 
the system’s variables resulting from a one standard deviation shock. We are able to verify that all 
the transitory shocks have a zero long-run impact on the four variables, whereas all permanent 
shocks have a non-zero impact, except for the identifying zero impact of economy activity. From 
this we can infer that oil revenues depend on both government demand and economic activity 
shocks, and that Ecuador needs to develop its fiscal system so as to ensure that tax revenues 
constitute not only the most important shock but also the most highly affected variable. 
5. Policy implications based on budget revenues elasticity
Having completed the fiscal sustainability exercise based on a CVAR, we chose to conduct a 
further experiment based on fiscal revenues elasticities. Given that the debt-GDP ratio had not put 
the Ecuadorian government under pressure over the last decade, we sought to show, by drawing 
comparisons with the situation in Europe, the consequences of a fiscal policy that fails to stabilize 
and increase tax revenues. 
Elasticities of different tax revenues (personal income taxes, corporate income taxes, indirect 
taxes, social security contributions and other receipts) and expenditure (unemployment benefits) 
/
,1,1 , lg , , ,0.103 0.11 0.135ll t lrev t ov t leai t lorev tu e e e e eB    
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with respect to output have been traditionally calculated by the OECD to estimate the sensitivity of 
these variables to the cycle. The method is described in Van den Noord, P. (2000) and updated in 
Girouard and André (2005). Through a regression analysis the output gap and the elasticities are 
used to derive the effect on taxes and expenditure arising from the economy’s cycles. Combining 
these estimates one can construct the cyclically adjusted budget balance (CAB) indicator, 
extensively used by the European Commission in order to measure the sustainability of fiscal 
policy of its member states, i.e. a fall in the primary CAB is interpreted as a sign of expansionary 
policy, a rise as an indication of a contractionary fiscal policy (European Commission, 2004). 
Empirical articles can either estimate elasticities through econometric methods or use these 
elasticities calculated by OECD in order to measure the sensitivity of expenditure and revenues 
separately21
Our experiment constitutes a mere graphical analysis instead. First, we calculate a simple
elasticity of government revenues with respect to GDP at current prices (erevgdp), which 
measures the contribution of a change of one percentage of output to budget revenues, i.e., the 
degree of connection between economic growth and government revenues. Subsequently, we 
graphic them with respect the budget revenues growth (growth_rev). 
.
In order to calculate the elasticities for the Eurozone countries we use quarterly data based on 
government statistics that have been drawn from Eurostat. The period covers 2001Q1-2007Q4, a 
boom period just before the crisis and when all the eight countries we study (Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) already belonged to the Eurozone22
We have also calculated the elasticities of current government expenditures, but the graphics are 
not presented for space reasons. We find that according to their elasticities, Eurozone countries 
can be split into two groups (A and B). Countries in Group B (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain) present the higher positive government expenditures elasticities, but as we are not 
interested in achieving balance budget through reducing government spending which would mean 
cutting welfare measures, this variable is not a subject of analysis. 
.
21 Bayoumi (1995) estimates the sensitivity of expenditure and revenues separately by ordinary least 
squares. She shows how in the U.S. the cyclical responsiveness of state budget is significantly affected by 
fiscal restraints. She also extents  the analysis to some European industrial countries such as Germany, 
France or Netherlands, considering the Maastricht  Treaty on Economic and  Monetary Union as restraints 
which significantly diminish the stabilization afforded by national budgets. Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1999) 
use both OECD and Bayoumi (1995)’s elasticities to review the reasons that have been encouraged the 
Stability and Growth Pact. One of these was the systemic risk of bank crisis owing to government’s failure 
to service its debt. More recently, Eller (2009) uses the European Commission’s elasticities to show that in 
the EU member states in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, budgetary positions react less 
strongly to GDP changes than in the euro area.
22 Greece became the twelfth EU Member State to adopt the single currency 1st January of 2001.
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Instead, we focus our analysis on revenues budget. The analysis has been completed for all the 
Eurozone countries with the same results and is available upon request. We will observe that, not 
only the magnitude of the elasticity matters, but also the position that each observation takes into 
the quadrants in Figure 2 (it displays the relationship between the elasticity of revenues with
respect to GDP and revenues growth) is important. Figure 2 in Annex II shows the graphics of 
two groups of countries: group A comprises three countries (Austria, France and Germany) with 
debt-GDP ratios under 100 percentage points in 2011Q4 together with Belgium, which exceeded 
this limit in 2012; while group B comprises three countries (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) with 
debt-GDP ratios over 100 percentage points together with Spain which, even though its debt-GDP 
ratio is similar to those in group A, suffers major credit problems as a result of the collapse of its 
banking sector and high levels of unemployment23
Greece for instance, shows low positive elasticities coinciding with rising revenues (the highest 
value does not reach 2.5) during all the period with only one exception: 2001Q4 (38.08). The
same  pattern is repeated in Portugal where the highest positive value of the elasticity is 13.88. 
Portugal is also the country with the highest negative elasticity located in quadrant III (-434.46 in 
2002Q3), but this observation was eliminated to facilitate the understanding of the Figures. Ireland 
would be the exception since the highest positive value of its revenue elasticity is 25.58, however 
its notable presence in both quadrant III and IV has undermined its fiscal revenues. Spain is in a 
delicate situation, even though its size is higher than that of the other countries in group B and 
according to the “too big to fail” theory this fact might preserve this country from excessive 
turbulent speculative attacks, it should increase its positive revenue’s elasticity to levels close to 
those registered by countries which conform Group A. Observations that correspond to Austria, 
Germany and France are predominantly situated into quadrant I, and the highest values of their 
The “x” axis corresponds to the revenues 
elasticity and the “y” axis to tax revenues growth. We interpret the graphics in function of their 
quadrants, the four sections into which the x-y plane is divided by the “x” and “y” axes. 
Observations in quadrant I with a positive elasticity and positive growth of revenues mean a 
positive growth of GDP. Conversely, observations in quadrant II with a negative elasticity and 
positive growth of revenues imply a decreasing GDP (so, it is expected that few observations yield 
into this quadrant). Likewise, we expect few observations in quadrant III, because revenues are 
descending when GDP is increasing as revenues elasticity is negative. Finally, quadrant IV show 
a positive connection between product and revenues, both are into downwards trends because 
elasticity is positive and revenues growth is negative. It is expected that countries with a negative 
or low positive degree of connection would present the worst debt problems. 
23 See the Eurostat report of debt-GDP ratio at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-
23072012-AP/EN/2- 23072012-AP-EN.PDF.
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revenues elasticity are of 37.18, 54.26 and 18.55, respectively. Even Austria is able to increase 
revenues while GDP is decreasing. The exception is Belgium with a revenue elasticity which does 
not reach the value of 8, which might explain why this country registers the biggest debt-GDP 
ratio in Group A. It is worthy to remark that this is the main difference between France and 
Belgium taken into account that revenue elasticity does not register negative values in both 
countries. 
In order to calculate the elasticities in Ecuador, we employ the same monthly data (converted to 
quarterly revenues) used in the CVAR models described above. We employ an initial elasticity for 
total revenue including oil revenue (etotalrevgdp) and a second for tax revenue (erevgdp) only. In
the case of Ecuador, Figure 3 illustrates that the relationship between revenues and output is poor 
(the majority of the observations are below the value of 5). Besides, it is worrisome those 
observations into quadrant III which represent negative revenue elasticity: revenues are
decreasing while GDP is increasing. 
Finally, Figure 4 and Figure 5 present the relationship between tax revenues growth and 
expenditure growth in the eight European countries we have studied and Ecuador, respectively, 
whilst Figures 6 and 7 display the relationships between debt- GDP ratios with deficit-GDP ratios 
in the above-mentioned Eurozone countries. 
Regarding countries of group B, Greece records the highest debt-GDP ratio before and after 
2007. Ireland has the second highest debt-GDP ratio reaching 100 percentage points. It is worth 
noting that Ireland has greater deficits but lower debt than Greece. It is comprehensive since, 
unlike Greece, it presents large periods with positive elasticity of revenues with respect to GDP, 
which allowed several surplus episodes before the crisis. Spain also accumulated surplus but 
recall that it presents a persistent low positive elasticity of revenues with respect to GDP. 
The above analysis can also be applied to the Ecuadorian economy. First, Ecuador does not 
present high positive elasticity of tax revenues with respect to GDP and second, its positive 
relationship between tax revenues and expenditures (see Figure 5) implies that Ecuador does not 
have enough sources of revenues to cover overall government spending. Unfortunately, Ecuador 
is following the same path as those countries in Group B above. Ecuador needs to diversify both 
its economy and tax system in order to strength the connection between the two and so as to face 
any future fiscal crises.
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6. Conclusions
This article seeks to clarify whether fiscal sustainability is possible in Ecuador taking into account 
that it is a dollarized country and one that is strongly dependent on oil revenues, which are 
particularly volatile because of price fluctuations. We estimate a cointegrated VAR using the 
variables that fulfil the intertemporal budget constraint and confirm previous findings that 
characterize Ecuadorian government expenditure in terms of its inertia and heavy dependence on 
oil revenues. We verify that Ecuador does not have a debt problem as the debt-GDP ratio can be 
excluded from the cointegration relation. We show that the debt-GDP ratio falls as long as 
government spending rises; therefore, we conclude that government expenditure is not tied to 
debt. In addition, this allows the Ecuadorian government to keep expenditure high as it does not 
increase the debt-GDP ratio. 
However, it would seem that given its non-diversified economy, Ecuador is vulnerable to future 
debt problems. If we analyse the evolution of total government expenditure of the Eurozone 
countries and their revenue behaviour since they became part of the EMU, it seems that Ecuador 
might be likely to suffer similar debt problems in the future. From calculations of the quarterly 
elasticity of tax revenues with respect to GDP, it can be seen that countries with high elasticities 
are the ones with the smallest debt problems today. However, Ecuador presents patterns of 
behaviour that are very similar to those presented by Eurozone economies with low tax revenues 
elasticities. But by diversifying its economy, and by basing it on a lasting, renewable sector, this 
elasticity should be raised, and eventually fiscal sustainability will depend on these stable, more 
profitable sectors.
The fact that Ecuador is a dollarized country means that it has relinquished control over both its 
interest rates and exchange rates, the latter being fundamental in failing sectors other than the oil 
sector. As such, Ecuador needs to rethink its exchange rate regime, before dollarization becomes 
counter-productive to budgetary positions. Whether a monetary union is among the alternatives 
open to Ecuador, it is our belief that within the framework of such a union the convergence of tax 
revenues elasticities might be a key factor in achieving successfully this exchange rate regime, so 
as to avoid any “non-odious and legitimate” debt crises that might end up being restructured.
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                               Document de Treball   2013/06 pàg. 19
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                              Working Paper          2013/06 pag. 19
19
References
Almeida, Mª D., Gallardo, V. and Tomaselli, A. (2006). “Gobernabilidad fiscal en Ecuador”. 
CEPAL Serie Nº 57. United Nations Press, ISBN: 92-1-322905-4. 
Alvarado, C., Izquierdo, A. and Panizza, U. (2004). “Fiscal Sustainability in Emerging Market 
Countries with an Application to Ecuador”.  Inter-American Development Bank. Research 
Department. Working Paper #511.
Barnhill, T., and G. Kopits (2003). “Assessing Fiscal Sustainability under Uncertainty.” IMF 
Working Paper 03/79. Washington, DC, United States: International Monetary Fund.
Barro, R. M.  (1986). “U.S. Deficits Since World War I”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 88, 
No. 1, 195-222.
Barro, R. M. (1979). “On the Determination of Public Debt”, Journal of Political Economy, 87, 940–
947. 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995). “Restraining yourself: the implications of fiscal rules for 
economic stabilization ”. International Monetary Fund Staff Papers. 
Baxter, M. and King, R. (1993). “Fiscal Policy in General Equilibrium” The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 83, No. 3 (Jun., 1993), pp. 315-334.
Blanchard, O. & Perotti, R. (2002). "An Empirical Characterization Of The Dynamic Effects Of 
Changes In Government Spending And Taxes On Output,"The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1329-1368, November.
Bohn, H. (2007). "Are stationarity and cointegration restrictions really necessary for the 
intertemporal budget constraint?,"Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(7), pages 
1837-1847, October.
Bohn, H. (2005). “The sustainability of fiscal policy in the United States”. CESifo Working Papers, 
No. 1446, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18810
Bohn, H. (1998). ”The Behaviour of U.S. public debt and deficits”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
113, 949-963.
Burnside, Craig & Eichenbaum, Martin & Fisher, Jonas D. M. (2004). "Fiscal shocks and their 
consequences,"Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 89-117, March.
Caldara, D. & Kamps, Ch. (2008). "What are the effects of fiscal shocks? A VAR-based 
comparative analysis,"Working Paper Series 877, European Central Bank.
Collignon, S. (2012) “Fiscal Policy Rules and the sustainability of public debt in Europe”. 
International Economic Review Volume 53, Issue 2, pages 539–567, May 2012.
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                               Document de Treball   2013/06 pàg. 20
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                              Working Paper          2013/06 pag. 20
20
Correa, R. (2005). “Canje de Deuda: Todo en Función de los Acreedores”, LA INSIGNIA, June 
20, 2005, available at http://www.lainsignia.org/2005/junio/econ_008.htm.
Cueva, S. (2008) “Ecuador: Fiscal Stabilization Funds and Prospects”. Inter-American 
Development Bank. Country Department Andean Group (CAN). Working Paper CSI-110. EC-
P1059.
Das, U., Papaioannou,M. and Trebesch, Ch. (2012). “Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950–2010: 
Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts”. FMI WP/12/203. 
Díaz-Cassou, J., Erce-Domínguez, A. and Vázquez-Zamora, Juan (2008). “Recent episodes of 
sovereign debt restructurings. A case study approach” . Documentos Ocasionales. N.º 0804. 
Banco de España.  
Eichengreen, B. and Wyplosz (1998) “The Stability Pact: More Than a Minor Nuisance?”. 
Economic Policy Volume 13, Issue 26, pages 65–113, April 1998
Eller M. (2009). “Fiscal position and Size of Automatic Stabilizers in the CESEE EU member 
states. Implications for discretionary measures”. Austrian Central Bank, Focus on European 
Economic Integration Q2/2009, Issue 2, pages 78-84.
Engle, R. F. and C. W. J. Granger (1987). Cointegration and error correction: Representation, 
estimation, and testing. Econometrica, 55(2), 251–276.
European Commission. 2004. Public Finances in EMU – 2004. European Economy No. 3. 
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication469_en.pdf
Favero, C., Giavazzi, F. and Perego, J. (2011). "Country Heterogeneity and the International 
Evidence on the Effects of Fiscal Policy,"IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 
59(4), pages 652-682, November.
Favero, C., Giavazzi, F. (2007). "Debt and the Effects of Fiscal Policy,"NBER Working Papers 
12822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 
Feibelman, A. (2010). “Ecuador’s Sovereign Default: A Pyrrhic Victory for Odious Debt?”. Journal 
of International Banking Law and Regulation (UK). Volume/Issue: 25-7 ( 2010), pp. 357-62. 
Fincke, B. and A. Greiner (2012). How to assess debt sustainability? Some theory and empirical 
evidence for selected euro area countries. Applied Economics 44 (28), pp. 3717-3724.
Girouard, N. and C. André (2005) Measuring cyclically-adjusted budget balances for OECD 
countries, OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 434.
Hoover, K., Johansen, S. and Juselius, K. (2007) "Allowing the data to speak freely: The 
macroeconometrics of the cointegrated vector autoregression. American Economic Review 98, 
pp. 251-55. 
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                               Document de Treball   2013/06 pàg. 21
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                              Working Paper          2013/06 pag. 21
21
Johansen, S. (1996). “Likelihood-Based Inference in Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive Models”, 
2.edn. Advanced Texts in Econometrics, Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Johansen, S. and K. Juselius (1992). “Testing structural hypotheses in a multivariate cointegration 
analysis of the PPP and the UIP for UK”. Journal of Econometrics 53, 211–244.
Johansen, S. and K. Juselius (1990). “Maximum likelihood estimation and inference on 
cointegration with application to the demand of money”. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics, 52(2), 169–210.
Juselius, K. (2009.) “Special Issue on Using Econometrics for Assessing Economic Models-An 
Introduction”. Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Vol. 3, 2009-28.
Juselius, K (2006). “The Cointegrated VAR Model: Methodology and Applications”, 1st edn, 
Oxford University Press, USA.
Kia, A. (2008). “Fiscal sustainability in emerging countries: Evidence from Iran and Turkey”. 
Journal of Policy Modeling. Vol. 30, issue 6, pages 957-972.
López-Cálix, J. (2003). “Maintaining Stability with Fiscal Discipline and Competitiveness.” In: V. 
Fretes-Cibilis, M. Giugale and J. López-Cálix, editors. Ecuador: An Economic and Social 
Agenda for the New Millennium. Washington, DC, United States: World Bank.
Marí, M. L. and Gómez-Puig, M (2013). “Pass-through in dollarized countries: should Ecuador 
abandon the U.S. Dollar?”. Applied Economics, forthcoming.
Mejía, A., Albornoz, V. and Araujo, M. (2007) “The Political Economy of the Budget Process: The 
Case of Ecuador”. Inter-American Development Bank. Regional Operations Department 3 
(RE3). Country Studies Series Working Paper CS-101. 
Moodys (2009). “Sovereign default and recovery rates, 1983-2008”. Moody’s global credit policy. 
Mountford, A. and Uhlig, H. (2009). “What are the effects of fiscal policy shocks?”. Journal of 
Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(6), pages 960-992.
Palley, Th. (2004). “The Economics of Exchange Rates and the Dollarization Debate”. Int’l. 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 33, no. 1, Spring 2003, pp. 61–82.
Perotti, R. (2008). "In Search of the Transmission Mechanism of Fiscal Policy,"NBER Chapters, 
in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2007, Volume 22, pages 169-226 National Bureau of
Economic Research, Inc.
Perotti, R. (2002). "Estimating the effects of fiscal policy in OECD countries". European Central 
Bank Working Papers Series Nº 168.
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                               Document de Treball   2013/06 pàg. 22
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                              Working Paper          2013/06 pag. 22
22
Quispe-Agnoli, M. and Whisler, E. (2006). “Official Dollarization and the Banking System in 
Ecuador and El Salvador”. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. Economic Review. Third Quarter 
2006.
Ramey, V. (2011). "Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It's all in the Timing,"The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(1), pages 1-50.
Ray, R. and Kozameh, S. (2012). “Ecuador’s Economy Since 2007”. Center for Economic and 
policy research. (http://www.cepr.net/index.php/publications/)
Romer Ch. and Romer, D. (2010) “The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes: Estimates Based 
on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks”.  American Economic Review 100 (June 2010): 763–801.
Salmon, F. (2009). “Lessons from Ecuador’s Bond Default”. Reuters article. May 29, 2009. 
Available at: http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/29/lessons-from-ecuadors-bond-
default/.
Sandoval, L. and Weisbrot, M. (2009). “Update on the Ecuadorian Economy”. Center for 
Economic and policy research (http://www.cepr.net/index.php/publications/reports/)
The World Bank (2005). “Creating Fiscal Space for Poverty Reduction in Ecuador. A Fiscal 
Management and Public Expenditure Review”. The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. World Bank Publications. ISBN-10 / ASIN: 0821362569. 
Tinsley, E. (2003). “Debt Administration and Sustainability.” In: V. Fretes-Cibilis, M. Giugales and 
J. López-Cálix, editors. Ecuador: An Economic and Social Agenda for the New Millennium. 
Washington, DC, United States: World Bank.
Van den Noord, P. (2000), “The Size and Role of Automatic Fiscal Stabilizers in the 1990s and 
Beyond”
OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 230, Paris.
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                               Document de Treball   2013/06 pàg. 23
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                              Working Paper          2013/06 pag. 23
23
Annex I. Econometric Model: Cointegrated VAR
Following Engle and Granger (1987), Johansen and Juselius (1990; 1992) extend the VAR model 
by applying the concepts of cointegration and error correction to analyse long run relations among 
non-stationary variables. This extension is referred to as cointegrated VAR. 
Consider the p- dimensional VAR (k):
                                                                                                  (1)
Where tX is a p*1 vector of endogenous variables with t=1,2..T; i is p*p matrices of 
parameters to be estimated with i=1,2…k; tD is a vector of deterministic terms as a constant, 
trend or dummy variables. Finally, te is a p*1 vector of error terms which follow a Gaussian 
distribution: te ~ iid with N(0,$%

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
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information about contemporaneous effects. And k is the number of lags necessary to have an 
appropriate model (no autocorrelation, no ARCH effects and normalized errors).
This p- dimensional VAR (k) can be re-written in the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) form:
                                                                                     (2)
Where, 
k
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
   represents the long run effects and 
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 
   the short run effects, with i= 1, 
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We have that
tX and t iX  are stationary because they perform first difference processes to 
get rid of the just one unit root that the level variables contain. Since a stationary process cannot 
be equal to a non-stationary process, the estimation results can only make sense if 
i defines 
stationary linear combinations of the variables (Juselius, 2006). 
i can be written i ( ")

 "  )
 *r matrices, r * p. Thus, under the I(1) hypothesis, the cointegrated VAR 
model is given by:
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where 
t 1' X  is an r*1 vector of stationary cointegration relations.  Under the hypothesis that   
t ~ I( 1)X all stochastic components are stationary in model (3) and the system is now logically 
consistent. 
Cointegration exists when two or more variables share common stochastic and deterministic 
trends, they move together in the long run, and therefore they can be interpreted as long-run 
economic steady-state relations.
t 1' X  = 0 describes a system in equilibrium where there is no economic adjustment force to 
change the system to a new position. When exogenous shocks affect the system, and 
t 1' X 
+
0 ,-.
 , pull the process back towards the long run equilibrium. If r=1 
there is a unique stationary relation. If r>1 only the cointegration space 
i (")   



&"%#

problem. 
The VECM expressed as a function of the innovations of the system shows which common 
stochastic trends are responsible for the non-stationarity of the process. 
t
*
t t t 0i t
i 1
( ) ( )( )C e C eX D L D X 

                                         t=1,2,…,T
Where:  1/ /( )C   

  
                    or                 
* /C   
Where: 
* 1/( )  

  

The idea is to determine which variables are simply adjusting to a long run equilibrium equation 
i.e. significant alphas ( ) in order to identify which ones are simply pushing the system 
(insignificant alphas, therefore   can be zero in the VECM). 
Knowing that / 0   , a zero row in alpha corresponds to a unit vector in  , we say that this 
variable is long-run weakly exogenous implying that its cumulated residuals can be considered a 
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common stochastic trend, then t/
i
i 1
e 

 is understood as an estimation of the p - r common 
stochastic trends. 
This does not imply that the variable itself is a common trend. For this we need the rows of the 
i matrices associated with the weakly exogenous variable to be zero. Given t I(1)X  this is 
essentially the condition of strong exogeneity, under which the equation for a strongly exogenous 
variable j ,tX becomes j ,t j ,tx e , in this case 
t
j ,t j ,i
i 1
x e

  : the common stochastic trend 
coincides with the variable itself, and then,  j ,tx will have a unit row vector in theC matrix. 
Similar to  and , we can transform 
*

and /  by a non-singular (p-r)*(p-r) matrix Q
without changing the value of the likelihood function:
* 1 *c /c / cQQ ( )C   

  
 
Additional restrictions on 
*

and   do constrain the likelihood function making possible the 
over identifying restrictions on   and   which can be expressed as testable restrictions on 
 and . In our case, with r=2 and 't t 1tt t[ , , ]g y,t dX  we test the weak exogeneity of debt 
level and economic activity in the following manner:                          
                    
With a C matrix:
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Even when the unrestricted C matrix gives very useful information about the effects of the 
stochastic driving forces in the VECM, and the restricted cC can be used to check the 
robustness of the analysis, the challenge is to recover the structural shocks in order to interpret 
the results empirically24
cC
. This means that we have to obtain the empirical shocks from a structural 
MA model, i.e. the structural matrix25
By premultiplying (2) with a non-singular p*p matrix B we obtain the VECM with simultaneous 
effect:
.
/
t 1 t 1 t 1 ttb uB X B X X B D      
Where
1 1B B , b B and t tu Be .
The B matrix defines how the structural shocks tu are associated with the VECM residuals27.
The structural MA representation of the CVAR: 
t
~ *~
t 0i t
i 1
C u C uX X

           
Where ~ 1C C B  and *~ * 1( L )C C B 
24 A column of insignificant coefficients means that the empirical shocks of the corresponding variable have 
only temporary effects on the variables of the system, while a column of significant coefficients means 
permanent effects. The rows in C matrix inform us about the weights with which each variable is influenced
by any of the cumulated empirical shocks.
25 Juselius (2006) points out that omitted relevant variables generate correlated p residuals in VAR, a 
feature that is not assumed to be present in the structural VAR model, where the orthogonality of structural 
VAR errors is based on an assumption that the model contains all the relevant variables. This is the main 
reason why the labelling of empirical residuals as structural shocks is often misleading.
27 We can find a B matrix to fulfil the following assumptions: (i) A distinction between r transitory and p / r
permanent shocks is made, i.e. 
t s p( , )u u u ; (ii) The transitory shocks have no long-run impact on the variables of the system whereas the 
permanent shocks have such effects on 
at least one variable in the system and (iii)
P
/
t tE( ) Iu u 
, i.e. all ‘structural’ shocks are linearly independent.
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Annex II. Figures 
Fig.1. Total government expenditures and Debt/GDP ratio in Ecuador.
Source: Central Bank of Ecuador and own estimates. The government expenditures include interest 
payments.  
Fig. 2. Relationship between the elasticity of revenues respect GDP and revenues 
growth of Eurozone countries.
Group A                                           Group B
            Source: Eurostat 
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Fig. 3 Relationship between revenue’s elasticities respect GDP and revenues growth 
of Ecuador 
          Source: Central Bank of Ecuador 
Fig. 4. Relationship between revenues growth expenditure growth in Eurozone 
countries.
Source: Eurostat 
Fig. 5. Relationship between tax revenues growth and expenditure growth in Ecuador.
          Sources: Central Bank of Ecuador
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Fig. 6 Relationship between Debt/GDP and Deficit/GDP in Eurozone countries during 
the period 2001-2006.
Group A                                                                  Group B                       
             Source: Eurostat 
Fig. 7. Relationship between Debt/GDP and Deficit/GDP in Eurozone countries during 
the period 2007-2011.
Group A                                                                    Group B
             Source: Eurostat 
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                               Document de Treball   2013/06 pàg. 30
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                              Working Paper          2013/06 pag. 30
30
Annex III. Empirical Results
Table. 1 Results of the I (1) analysis for the first model.
With permanent and seasonal dummies Excluding all sort of dummies
p-r R Eig..
Value
Trace Trace* Frac95 p p* p-r r Eig.
Value
Trace Trace* Frac95 p p*
4 0 0.273 82.67 78.18 63.659 0.000 0.002 4 0 0.301 92.2 87.68 63.659 0.000 0.000
3 1 0.131 35.85 34.09 42.770 0.214 0.289 3 1 0.137 39.7 38.11 42.770 0.100 0.140
2 2 0.064 15.28 14.24 25.731 0.558 0.642 2 2 0.067 18.1 17.47 25.731 0.343 0.388
1 3 0.037 5.613 4.521 12.448 0.521 0.670 1 3 0.053 7.95 7.491 12.448 0.263 0.305
(*) Corresponds to the Bartlett corrected trace test. 
Table. 2 Results of testing restrictions on beta and alpha for the first model.
Test of exclusion (restrictions on beta) Test of weak exogeneity  (restrictions on 
alpha)
r DGF 5%
C.V.
lexp lrev leai Ldebt_
gdp
trend r DGF 5%
C.V.
lexp Lrev leai Ldebt_
gdp
1 1 3.84 15.709
[0.000]
26.062
[0.000]
10.856
[0.001]
3.107
[0.078]
0.031
[0.86]
1 1 3.84 0.235
[0.628]
20.248
[0.000]
3.200
[0.074]
0.996
[0.318]
2 2 5.99 22.961
[0.000]
33.603
[0.000]
17.227
[0.000]
5.488
[0.064]
8.688
[0.013]
2 2 5.99 4.450
[0.108]
28.577
[0.000]
8.460
[0.015]
8.137
[0.017]
3 3 7.81 24.054
[0.000]
37.598
[0.000]
19.969
[0.000]
6.194
[0.103]
12.261
[0.007]
3 3 7.81 4.628
[0.201]
31.513
[0.000]
12.350
[0.006]
11.563
[0.009]
LR test, Chi-square(r), p-values in brackets.
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Table. 3 Results of the I (1) analysis for the second model.
With permanent and seasonal dummies Excluding all sort of dummies
p-r r Eig..
Value
Trace Trace* Frac95 p p* p-r r Eig.
Value
Trace Trace* Frac95 p p*
4 0 0.308 96.99 92.07 63.659 0.000 0.002 4 0 0.341 113.17 108.456 63.659 0.000 0.000
3 1 0.152 42.89 41.50 42.770 0.049 0.067 3 1 0.166 51.862 50.389 42.770 0.004 0.006
2 2 0.088 18.58 17.54 25.731 0.312 0.383 2 2 0.105 25.213 24.035 25.731 0.058 0.082
1 3 0.034 5.018 4.733 12.448 0.601 0.640 1 3 0.059 8.872 8.484 12.448 0.193 0.221
(*) Corresponds to the Bartlett corrected trace test. 
Table. 4 Results of testing restrictions on beta and alpha for the second model.
Test of exclusion (restrictions on beta) Test of weak exogeneity  (restrictions on 
alpha)
r DGF 5%
C.V.
lrev lgov leai lorev trend r DGF 5%
C.V.
lrev Lgov leai lorev
1 1 3.84 28.177
[0.000]
25.457
[0.000]
15.384
[0.000]
11.085
[0.001]
0.030
[0.863]
1 1 3.84 13.057
[0.000]
4.017
[0.045]
5.300
[0.021]
3.152
[0.076]
2 2 5.99 38.515
[0.000]
35.433
[0.000]
15.402
[0.000]
20.339
[0.000]
1.898
[0.387]
2 2 5.99 22.829
[0.000]
14.217
[0.001]
6.111
[0.047]
5.504
[0.064]
3 3 7.81 46.776
[0.000]
38.276
[0.000]
22.590
[0.000]
26.470
[0.000]
9.734
[0.021]
3 3 7.81 31.320
[0.000]
15.881
[0.001]
13.060
[0.005]
8.685
[0.034]
Table 5. Residual S.E. and Cross- Correlations for the second model
lrev lgov leai lorev
Residual S.E. 0.02922825 0.05619247 0.02272652 0.12829084
Lrev 1.000
Lgov 0.883 1.000
Leai 0.708 0.294 1.000
lorev 0.959 0.980 0.478 1.000
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Fig. 7 The impulse response functions for the two permanent shocks and transitory 
shocks. 
Table 6 Impact after 23 periods                           Table 7 B normalized matrix [U(t)=B*EPS(t)]
Trans(1) Trans(2) Perm(1) Perm(2)
LREV 0.034 0.023 2.054 2.037
LGOV 0.034 0.021 1.637 5.348
LEAI 0.007 0.004 2.270 -0.007
LOREV -0.040 -0.028 6.156 11.295
EPS(1) EPS(2) EPS(3) EPS(4)
Trans(1) 1.000 0.069 -0.437 -0.046
Trans(2) -0.388 1.000 0.707 -0.232
Perm(1) 0.103 -0.110 1.000 0.135
Perm(2) 0.233 -0.961 1.000 -0.381
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